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Introduction 
  
This paper explores the relationship between projects and innovation in humanitarian 
emergency response. This is an area that has to date received little attention from either 
project management or innovation scholars. Despite this lack of academic interest, the fields 
of humanitarian policy and practice have in recent years increasingly adopted the language of 
innovation and project management to describe and give shape to their activities (Betts & 
Bloom, 2014; Curlee & Fleischer, 2005; Fitz-Gerald, Molinaro, & Neal, 2001; Obrecht & 
Warner, 2016; Whitehead, 2015). This discursive shift has largely been driven by a growing 
recognition of the severe challenges facing humanitarian aid. According to the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2017b), the number of 
people affected by natural disasters in 2016 was 204 million, with 65.6 million forcibly 
displaced by violence and conflict. Of these, 130.5 million were judged to be in need of 
humanitarian aid, with the total rising again in 2017 to 135.7 million (OCHA, 2017a). In the 
last 10 years, the number of people targeted for assistance has more than trebled, from 31 
million to 95 million (OCHA, 2017a). Funding has also increased dramatically over the same 
period, but the gap between requirements, as assessed by Humanitarian Response Plans 
(HRPs) for different regions and countries, and funding received has increased fourfold 
(OCHA, 2017a).  
  
Given these massive and growing needs, combined with constant pressure on the resources 
available to address them, it is not surprising that the humanitarian sector has turned to the 
concepts and practices of project management and innovation in the hope of finding 
solutions. They have been used as a way of structuring its response to what is increasingly 
presented as a crisis of the overall humanitarian system (Chandran, 2015; Ramalingam, 2013; 
The Guardian, 2016). Each in their own way, project and innovation management are 
typically rooted in discourses of efficiency and effectiveness, offering the promise of being 
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able to achieve more with the same or fewer resources. However, our argument in this paper 
is that there are also important differences between the two domains as constituted within the 
humanitarian context which sets them in opposition to each other and frequently leads to 
tensions. This is in contrast to a growing theme in the wider literature on projects that regards 
them as more complementary, with projects often being seen as a vehicle for delivering 
change and innovation in the face of uncertainty (Davies, 2014; Davies & Hobday, 2005; 
Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). 
  
In the case of humanitarian emergency response, the projectification (Midler, 1995; Johan 
Packendorff & Lindgren, 2014) of the field has largely taken the form of efforts to 
standardise, regulate, and professionalise humanitarian activities (Dijkzeul, Hilhorst, & 
Walker, 2013; James, 2016; Walker, Hein, Russ, Bertleff, & Caspersz, 2010). The main 
emphasis is on enhancing the operational efficiency of the humanitarian system, which is an 
entirely rational response in trying to cope with the scale, complexity, and uncertainty of 
humanitarian emergencies. Although many human and natural disasters have effects that 
require long-term interventions over a number of years, the humanitarian system 
simultaneously needs to be able to respond quickly and efficiently to unpredictably changing 
conditions and rapid onset disasters across different parts of the world (Chandran, 2015). 
Standardised project procedures, clear roles and responsibilities, coordination and logistics 
mechanisms, and stockpiles of latent resources and equipment, all help the humanitarian 
system to mobilise quickly. 
  
However, this focus on operational rationalisation is not necessarily consistent with 
promoting the various activities and stages of an effective innovation process, echoing a long-
established theme in the literature on organisations and innovation (e.g. March, 1991; 
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). As they have evolved in the humanitarian field, project 
management and innovation, although relatively recent discursive tropes in this setting, are 
potentially crystallising into two competing institutional logics (Bresnen & Marshall, 2011; 
Townley, 2002). This paper explores the implications of this trend, particularly in terms of 
the effects on humanitarian innovation. This latter choice of focus is because the 
interpretations of project management knowledge within the humanitarian community are 
arguably already consistent with the existing institutional landscape. As such, they are 
absorbed into and reinforce the dominant logic. In contrast, innovation, as an explicit subject 
of policy and practice, represents more of a departure from the status quo and, consequently, 
faces the usual inertia in seeking to effect any wide-ranging institutional transformation. Even 
so, there have been important steps towards promoting the humanitarian innovation agenda, 
drawing together a diverse range of actors, albeit with some voices being clearly more 
dominant than others. We explore these trends through evidence from a case study of one of 
the main sub-sectors of emergency response, the provision of water, sanitation, and hygiene 
promotion (WASH). 
  
The remainder of this paper outlines the conceptual background and approach used to explore 
the relationship between projects and innovation in the humanitarian sector, followed by a 
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discussion of the research method, and a commentary on the main themes identified in the 
case study of WASH. 
  
Understanding projects and innovation in the humanitarian sector 
  
Until more recently, research on projects and innovation have tended to be conducted in 
parallel, with little communication between the two communities of scholars (Brady & 
Hobday, 2011; Davies, 2014; Davies & Hobday, 2005). This has changed, to some extent at 
least, in the last few years, but there is still substantial scope for clarifying the relationship 
between the two. It is often suggested, for example, that projects offer a suitable 
organisational form for promoting innovation. As Brady and Hobday (2011, p.276) have 
commented: “Whereas functional organizations focus inwardly on increasing performance by 
perfecting standardized processes and outputs, project structures focus outwardly on solving 
specific customer problems and encouraging innovation.” At the same time, one of the major 
developments in the project literature has been a recognition of the wide variety of project 
forms and activities (Lundin et al., 2015; Lundin & Söderholm, 1995; Söderlund, 2011). This 
has been accompanied by an acknowledgement of the contingent nature of projects, their 
deployment for a whole range of purposes within and across different sectors, and their 
embeddedness in varying social, economic, and political settings (Engwall, 2003; Grabher, 
2003; Lundin et al., 2015).  
  
Thus, while projects are often used with the aim of supporting the innovation process, this is 
not always the case. As Lenfle (2008) and Brady and Hobday (2011) have proposed, some 
projects are focused on exploitation or optimisation, drawing on existing competencies to 
pursue clear and predefined objectives, while others are used for exploring emerging 
innovation fields (c.f. March, 1991). Consistent with arguments about organisational 
ambidexterity, the challenge is presented as how to manage the competing demands of 
exploration and exploitation; one way of doing this is through having a portfolio of 
differently positioned projects. For a variety of reasons explored in this paper, the 
humanitarian system presents a different situation. Its focal projects - the delivery of life-
saving interventions in response to emergencies - have increasingly been the target of 
attempts to standardise and formalise them. They are about exploiting existing capabilities 
and refining them to provide a more coordinated, reliable, and efficient response to 
unpredictable, complex, and uncertain humanitarian crises. Although by no means the whole 
story, a particular discourse of project management has contributed to this trend. 
Paradoxically, however, these efforts at optimisation at the operational project level, driven 
by the best intentions of ‘doing good’, have arguably reduced the overall innovative capacity 
of the humanitarian system, ultimately undermining this overall purpose. 
 
In this respect, humanitarian emergency response faces a similar paradox to that identified in 
the more critical projects literature, where the technical rationality of planning and control at 
the heart of project management regularly fails to live up to its own exacting expectations 
(Cicmil, Hodgson, Lindgren, & Packendorff, 2009; Cicmil, Williams, Thomas, & Hodgson, 
2006; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Hodgson & Cicmil, 2006; Johann Packendorff, 1995). A good 
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example of this is the burgeoning strand of work on megaprojects (Davies, Gann, & Douglas, 
2009; Flyvbjerg, 2003, 2007, 2014, 2017; van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & Veenswijk, 2008). 
As Sanderson (2012) has argued, there are different explanations why such projects do not 
meet the goals set for them, each grounded in different assumptions about risk, uncertainty, 
and governability. These include strong incentives for project sponsors, contractors, and other 
interested parties to misrepresent the viability of projects (Flyvbjerg, 2003, 2014; Flyvbjerg, 
Holm, & Buhl, 2002), the lack of robust governance arrangements able to cope with the 
unavoidable uncertainty and complexity of major projects (Miller & Lessard, 2001; Winch, 
2009), and the collision of multiple cultures and rationalities competing in the day-to-day 
negotiation of project activities (Clegg, Pitsis, Marosszeky, & Rura-Polley, 2006; Pitsis, 
Clegg, Marosszeky, & Rura-Polley, 2003). Each in their own way these features of 
megaprojects highlight the limitations of planning and control, from which lessons for 
emergency response projects can be drawn. However, there are also important differences 
between the two types of projects, especially in the perception of risk.  
 
The literature on megaprojects seeks to explain why these challenging endeavours, with high 
likelihood of failure, ever get off the ground in the first place. There are similarities here with 
the work by Hirschman (2015 [1967]) on development projects, where he introduces the 
principle of ‘the hiding hand’. His argument is that people over-estimate the likelihood of 
success when initiating a project because they are ignorant of the costs and difficulties they 
will encounter. However, when unanticipated obstacles and challenges do arise, great efforts 
are often made to overcome them, leading to creative solutions. This is an effectively positive 
view of people’s capacity to cope with challenges. While Flyvbjerg (2014) concurs many 
major projects would not even get going without a strong element of optimism and hubris, 
Flyvbjerg and Sunstein (2016) challenge the principle of the hiding hand, arguing that it is 
more often malevolent than benevolent, hiding obstacles that have little chance of being 
overcome. Either way, it is clear that over-confidence often plays a key role in getting major 
projects started, encouraging those involved to take on risks they might otherwise be 
unwilling to. 
 
Although there are many similarities between development and humanitarian emergency 
response projects, an important difference is that the former are projective whereas the latter 
are reactive, responding to disasters as they occur.2 This lends them a different character in 
terms of perceptions of risk and uncertainty. For emergency response, the issue is not so 
much about whether or not it is too risky to initiate the project, but more about the dangers of 
not acting, especially in situations where time is of the essence. This position is guided by the 
widely espoused values among humanitarian actors of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and 
                                                          
2 This does not mean that all disasters attract the same attention. As de Waal (2010, p.S133) notes: “Among 
the governmental donors to humanitarian programmes, and among the relief agency executives who help to 
shape the global humanitarian response priorities each year, there is policy triage. Some crises elicit a far 
greater response than others. We like to believe that the main criterion for a relief response is gravity of need. 
But that is always a subjective estimate, and is always modulated by other considerations such as danger, 
difficulty and expense.” 
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independence in providing assistance to alleviate suffering of those who need it (Carbonnier, 
2015).3 Although it is perhaps counter-intuitive, given that humanitarian response involves 
operating under extreme conditions of disaster or conflict, attitudes to risk displayed by 
humanitarian organisations are widely considered to be increasingly conservative. These 
attitudes have been shaped by successive rounds of evaluation following humanitarian 
interventions, especially where these have been judged to be less than successful, prompting 
ever greater emphasis on formalising mechanisms for planning and control in an effort to 
minimise further harm (Christopher & Tatham, 2011; Cioffi-Revilla, 2014; Fitz-Gerald et al., 
2001). However, we argue that a by-product of this attitude to risk has been a caution about 
novelty, which can create barriers to innovation. In this respect, emergency response shares 
something in common with high reliability organisations. According to Rijpma (2003, pp. 
41–42), such organisations “are extremely vigilant in identifying potential hazards. They are 
also reluctant to learn in a trial-and-error mode, because the first error may be the last trial. 
They therefore set up reporting systems to detect and learn from any incident or disturbance 
that occurs, because, in their philosophy, even a minor disturbance may set a sequence in 
motion that ends up in disaster.”. This means that innovation can become partly uncoupled 
from operational activities and, to the extent that it occurs, is shaped by a logic of 
optimisation and incremental changes to existing ways of doing things. In the case of 
humanitarian emergency response, there is a preference for tried-and-tested equipment, 
processes, and organisational arrangements during intervention projects. This is 
understandable as an attempt to enhance predictability of those elements over which 
practitioners have some control when working under conditions of unpredictability and 
limited control. However, it also introduces a number of barriers to more radical innovations 
which, given the increasing demands on the humanitarian system are highly likely to limit the 
capacity of humanitarianism to achieve its (also expanding) ambitions. 
 
In seeking to understand the complex influences on the relationship between humanitarian 
projects and innovation, we draw inspiration from practice-based approaches, focusing on the 
interlocking practices and institutional work involved in shaping the evolution of different 
elements of action in the humanitarian field (Bourdieu, 1990; Marshall, 2014; Nicolini, 2012; 
Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, & von Savigny, 2001). Based on a refinement of the conceptual 
framework developed by Ramalingam et al. (2015), this involves looking in detail at the 
following thematic areas and the practices surrounding them: 
 
o Resources - focusing on the practices through which resources of different kinds 
(finance, people, time, knowledge, technologies, political influence) are generated 
and deployed. 
o Roles - including how these are constituted, the activities they are formally and 
informally involved in, the power they have in shaping the system in terms of the 
ability to mobilise different types of resources (see above). 
                                                          
3 As they have evolved, these core humanitarian principles arguably entail similar, if not greater, levels of 
optimism as megaprojects given that the definition of need is by no means fixed and there has been a reliable  
tendency for the ambitions of humanitarianism to increase even faster than the capacity of the humanitarian 
system to meet them (Barnett, 2005). 
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o Relationships - practices governing the relationships and interactions between 
actors (and other non-human elements) in the humanitarian system. These may 
take numerous forms, whether competitive or collaborative, bureaucratic or 
market-based, long term or short term. 
o Rules - the formal and informal rules relating to humanitarian work which help to 
shape roles and responsibilities, activities and interactions, deployment of 
resources, etc. 
o Routines - closely related to rule-driven practices, routines refer to the myriad 
repeatable patterns of behaviour and ways of thinking that help to constitute the 
humanitarian system. These may be more or less widely shared, from highly 
localised ways of doing things, to globally standardised procedures. 
o Results - These are the evaluative practices through which the results of 
humanitarian action are measured and judged. These are significant because they 
play an important role in establishing its legitimacy and ensuring the continuing 
flow of resources from donors and other actors. They also shape how those 
involved in the humanitarian system view what they do and where efforts for 
innovation and learning are concentrated. 
  
An important benefit of this framework is that it focuses attention on key elements that 
together help to shape the dynamics of any given field of social action. Crucially, it also 
provides a workable vocabulary for making sense of particular empirical settings, offering 
alternative lenses through which to bring different aspects into sharper focus. It is important 
to acknowledge, however, that the act of separating into different categories, while useful for 
certain sensemaking purposes, also distracts attention from others. By choosing to focus on 
these elements individually, for example, we risk downplaying the connections between them 
and the processes through which they evolve. 
 
Research method 
  
The paper is based on data from a year-long study of humanitarian innovation conducted for 
the UK Department for International Development (DfID). The research involved three main 
strands of work. The first was an extensive literature review of relevant developments in 
innovation management and humanitarian innovation (Bessant et al., 2014). Secondly, we 
carried out semi-structured interviews with around 50 respondents, connected in varying 
capacities with the humanitarian sector, to build up an overall picture of the nature of the 
humanitarian innovation ecosystem. These included senior staff in donor organisations, 
governmental and international agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
academics, management consultants, and private sector suppliers. The third strand of the 
research programme involved five in-depth case studies. Four of these focused on key areas 
of humanitarian emergency response: food, shelter, health, and water, sanitation, and hygiene 
(WASH). The fifth case study was an investigation of humanitarian funding models and their 
implications for innovation. Overall 150 interviews were conducted during this stage, as well 
as a wide-ranging analysis of documentary sources and secondary material. This paper 
concentrates on the findings from the WASH case study, although drawing relevant insights 
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from the other cases and stages of the research. As with the other case studies, the analysis 
was based on multiple rounds of coding (using Atlas.ti) thematically guided by the sets of 
practices referred to in the previous section, as well as issues relating to the various stages 
and activities of innovation. As mentioned above, this paper uses the thematic categories as 
different interpretative lenses for exploring the broader institutional shaping of projects and 
innovation in the humanitarian domain. As such, we focus less on the other aspects of the 
coding, such as those looking at the more concrete unfolding of innovation and project 
activities over time.4 
  
The case of water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) 
  
This section presents the main themes emerging from the study of the WASH sub-sector in 
terms of the relationship between projects and innovation. These are organised according to 
the practice areas identified in the conceptual framework, with some areas combined for ease 
of discussion. However, before turning to these it is useful to provide some background to the 
nature of the WASH sub-sector and its position among the various activities involved in 
humanitarian emergency response. 
 
As the humanitarian field developed, an increasingly formalised system of specialist roles 
and responsibilities emerged. These divide up the response effort into a number of critical 
activities usually required, to a greater or lesser extent, in any emergency situation. These 
include the provision of shelter, food, medical assistance, security, and WASH. Each of these 
areas have tended to develop their own assemblages and repertoires of specialised 
knowledge, technologies, and behaviours. In the case of WASH, as the separate components 
of the acronym suggest, the sub-sector is further subdivided into three different but related 
areas: water, sanitation, and hygiene promotion. A number of interviewees commented that 
there are more similarities between water and sanitation respectively than with hygiene 
promotion. Water and sanitation are usually perceived as having a more engineering focus, 
with an emphasis on equipment and technological solutions, whereas hygiene promotion is 
considered to be more about behavioural issues, with practitioners drawn more from social 
science disciplines than engineering backgrounds. Having said that, there has been a more 
recent acknowledgement of the need to understand different cultural practices relating to 
water and especially sanitation. As one interviewee commented: 
 
“Sanitation is a tougher one than water – you can do a lot with technology in water – 
but if you look at sanitation I think 90% is about human behaviour.  So the 
innovations there has to be more around how you engage with people than with 
technology and science.  There is technology and science that can make it easier and 
                                                          
4 There is something of a social science version of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle operating here: the 
more closely we look at the individual components of the conceptual framework, the more their temporal and 
processual interactions slip from view. It is difficult to keep both perspectives in equal focus at the same time, 
as we have experienced in writing other analyses of the data using a more process-based lens on humanitarian 
innovation (e.g. Ramalingam et al., 2015). 
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better but, more often than not, when I look at what is going on ... if people do not 
want to use it they are not going to us it.” (Interview W05). 
 
The nature of project and innovation activities in the three WASH sub-sectors is also 
influenced by the relative priority they are accorded in the time-based hierarchy of 
emergency response activities and the order in which they are delivered, although this too is 
changing. According to one respondent: “We used to rush in and just do water and then do 
sanitation if we had time.  Now you don’t go in unless you’re doing all three.” (Interview 
W41). This shift has been influenced, among other things, by the changing temporality of 
emergencies and how emergency response is classified.5 Rapid onset disasters constitute a 
significant portion of demand for humanitarian action, but the immediacy suggested by the 
language of disaster relief and emergency response can be misleading. Many humanitarian 
crises develop relatively slowly and the effects of disasters can be protracted. For example, 
according to UNHCR figures, 13.4 million refugees (two-thirds of the total refugee 
population) were classified as being in protracted refugee situations at the end of 2017, 
having been displaced for five or more years (UNHCR, 2018). Longer time horizons for 
humanitarian emergency interventions have encouraged a greater focus on more enduring 
WASH provision, shifting attention to sanitation and hygiene promotion. Even so, water 
continues to attract the majority of attention and resources. Although precise figures are not 
available, the consensus among interviewees was that around 80% of operational funding in 
WASH goes to water. As we shall see in the following sections, practices surrounding the 
allocation of resources have an important influence on the nature of humanitarian emergency 
projects and the relative emphasis on operational and innovation activities. 
 
Resources 
 
Resource allocation strongly favours operational projects over innovation activities. To a 
large extent this is driven by the demands of donors (actual and expected) and the need to 
maintain the legitimacy of humanitarian action (Macrae, 1998; Olsen, Carstensen, & Høyen, 
2003). It is about demonstrating the judicious and efficient use of resources in responding to 
humanitarian needs. Donors expect a high proportion of their contributions to be seen directly 
helping those targeted for assistance. Activities not directly related to delivering support to 
those in need are typically given a lower priority. This tends to mean that there are 
significantly fewer resources available for innovation because the direct benefits are not 
immediately obvious or, given the uncertain nature of innovation, may not actually 
materialise. It also means that those innovations that do emerge are often ad hoc and 
                                                          
5 As with any sort of classification, the boundaries of meaning are arbitrary and potentially subject to 
continuous renegotiation, but nonetheless can have important practical implications (Bowker & Star, 1999). A 
good example of this is the distinction drawn between humanitarian response and development initiatives, 
which have evolved into separate spheres of practice despite considerable overlap in their goals and activities. 
The increasing focus of humanitarian action on long term chronic emergencies blurs the boundaries with 
development and yet many interviewees identified a continuing separation and distance between the two sets 
of practitioners. 
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incremental, occurring during operational activities and/or within the constraints of existing 
resources. 
 
The amount of resources specifically dedicated to innovation activities are miniscule in 
comparison with those committed to operational priorities. As far as we are aware, there have 
so far been no systematic attempts to calculate the proportion of the overall WASH budget 
that is spent annually on innovation. While some of the larger humanitarian actors have 
started to set aside money for formal innovation activities, created specific roles for 
innovation managers or champions, and established labs or innovation spaces, no total figures 
exist for such expenditure and even within individual organisations there are no reliable 
estimates of what proportion may have gone to WASH related innovative activities. In our 
interviews, rough estimates were made by knowledgeable sources that historically 80% of 
such expenditure will have been on water, although within the last five years there has been a 
significant increase in spending on sanitation to, perhaps as much as 40% of the total.  
Innovation spending on emergency hygiene has been described as being “miniscule”. When 
asked if WASH humanitarian innovation spending might be as high as 1% of total 
expenditure, only one large donor interviewed thought that this seemed like a reasonable 
assumption. Most felt it was considerably less.   
 
This is influenced by the dominant structure of funding for humanitarian emergency 
response. As with other non-profit areas where activities are dependent on charitable 
donations and government funding, there is the expectation that the money received will be 
used for the direct benefit of target groups rather than for overheads or other indirect costs 
(Caviola, Faulmüller, Everett, Savulescu, & Kahane, 2014; Portillo & Stinn, 2018). For 
individual donors, the visibility of humanitarian operations has been shown to have an 
important effect on the willingness to give money (Olsen et al., 2003).6 This is partly about 
demonstrating presence, with NGOs and other humanitarian actors ensuring they have 
enough branded “t-shirts on the ground”. For governmental and institutional funders, there 
are detailed rules about how resources can be used and typically strict requirements about 
reporting and demonstrating impact. These tend to encourage risk avoidance and impose 
funding cycles that tend to promote a short-term focus, both of which can constrain 
innovation. As one interviewee commented: “… with one year funding over and over again 
there isn’t time to do it differently.  You do one twelve months cycle and you are already 
writing your next proposal after nine mouths.  You are stuck.  There is no space to innovate.” 
(Interview W28) 
 
Roles and relationships 
 
The humanitarian sector is an enormously complex ecosystem of actors, activities, and 
interactions, creating huge challenges in terms of coordination and managing appropriate 
                                                          
6 While visibility is important, this is not a case of ‘there is no such thing as bad publicity’. This is shown by the 
response of donors to recent media reports about sexual misconduct among aid workers and how these had 
not been acted upon by NGO senior managers, with accusations of a deliberate cover up.  
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responses to crises. The role of the UN in coordinating international humanitarian emergency 
response has been progressively strengthened and formalised over the last fifty years through 
a series of resolutions of the General Assembly. The timing of these has typically been in 
response to particular landmark events where the system of relief is seen to have come under 
strain and, in the most extreme cases, conspicuously failed. As the UN Joint Inspection Unit 
(Allen, Sibahi, & Sohm, 1980, p. p.1) noted: “The hundreds of donor governments and 
international and voluntary organisations involved in international relief have often provided 
a chaotic ‘non-system’ of independent responses to disaster needs, resulting in waste, 
omissions, duplication and inefficiency in the delivery of relief supplies, equipment and 
personnel.” 
 
Landmarks include the decision to set up the UN Office of the Disaster Relief Coordinator 
(DRC), based in Geneva, in 1971, the establishment of the Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs and appointment of an Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) in 1992, the creation of 
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee in 1992, which was subsequently restructured to form 
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in 1998, and the formation of 11 
sector or theme-based clusters in 2005. The WASH cluster commenced operations in 2006 
under the leadership of UNICEF. It is made up of 32 full-time members drawn from UN 
agencies, international organisations, and international NGOs, with active roles also being 
played by donor organisations, civil response agencies, and academic institutions. As with the 
other landmark developments, the cluster approach is mainly about improving the 
coordination of complex response efforts during emergency situations through preparedness 
and project planning. It is primarily intended to optimise operational effectiveness under 
conditions of extreme uncertainty, especially during rapid onset emergencies where the speed 
and efficiency of response can have a major effect in reducing the scale of suffering. The 
cluster approach came about because of notable coordination failures, specifically relating to 
the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 (Ayele, 2014). 
 
The positive intentions of these efforts to improve operational effectiveness are undoubted 
and few would question their necessity. However, their benefits have not been evenly spread, 
with some clusters being seen as performing better than others. Several interviewees 
commented that the WASH cluster is relatively cohesive and well-functioning. According to 
one respondent: “The WASH cluster is quite a cohesive sector. It is a strong functioning 
cluster compared to some others and there are recognised actors. There is a level of cohesion 
that lends itself to push forward innovations. There is a strong global structure.” (Interview 
W32). Even so, innovation tends to be more an informal by-product of interactions between 
cluster members than something that is consciously pursued. A good example of this is the 
Emergency Sanitation Project, a consortium of NGOs funded by OFDA, designed to identify 
specific areas of need in this area. According to one respondent: “This came out of a few 
meetings and there was a lot of kind of discussion in the corridors at cluster meetings or 
whatever saying sanitation is a problem, we're not really getting the results we want from 
suppliers and things like that ... And I think there were some high aims on that trying to get 
some different voices into the discussion.”  (Interview W34).  
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Another barrier to effective innovation involves disconnections between operational projects 
(i.e. emergency interventions in response to humanitarian crises) and the innovation process. 
Innovations are often developed distant from the context of use, which can mean that they are 
not necessarily responding to the specific needs of users and beneficiaries. Several 
interviewees complained about overly technical, complicated, and expensive technologies for 
water and sanitation developed with little understanding of the specific needs of different 
emergencies. According to one NGO practitioner: “Despite glimmers of a system of 
innovation, the sector is still a prisoner of its funding structure and political history … it is 
very competitive at all levels between donors, agencies, suppliers, etc., and all focused on 
securing access to more funds … not necessarily producing better ways of doing things called 
for by the voices/demands of the end user/market.  There is lip service to higher ideals of co-
ordination, co-operation etc.” 
 
The ultimate success of the innovation process depends on being able to make connections 
between the needs of users and the potential innovations able to meet those needs.  How this 
is achieved typically sits on a spectrum between demand-pull and technology- (or solution-) 
push, although the emphasis in the innovation literature more recently has been on 
approaches that combine elements of both through co-design and a more interactive 
engagement between users and producers.  However, as suggested in the literature on user 
innovation, it is not always obvious who users are, let alone what their needs are (von Hippel, 
1986, 2005).  In the case of the WASH sector, several of those interviewed identified NGOs 
as the primary users of innovations as they are the ones who deliver the innovations on the 
ground when responding to emergencies.  As such, they are in a suitable position to be able to 
specify what solutions are needed and whether they work in practice.  
 
Having said that, it is evident that there are potentially multiple types of user, including both 
large and small NGOs, UN agencies, governments, community groups, the armed forces, and 
affected populations themselves.  As one respondent put it, “It's difficult to define the real 
needs because there [are] many people and organizations involved”.  It would appear that 
there are three main challenges in attempting to define innovation needs in the humanitarian 
area: firstly, it is not always clear who is the main beneficiary; secondly, there is the issue of 
who is able to act as an effective voice for beneficiaries (e.g. local community leaders, 
governments, NGOs); and thirdly, it is uncertain whether those representing beneficiaries 
have a deep understanding of needs in response to any particular humanitarian crisis. 
   
There is nevertheless a clear recognition that successful innovations are those that ultimately 
meet the needs of those affected by humanitarian crises on the ground.  However, there are 
important variations in the extent to which actors engaged in innovation have direct 
experience of such needs and, therefore, there is  a potential disconnect between affected 
communities, those that deliver emergency responses, and those that generate innovations. In 
the opinion of one respondent: “Agencies seem to view that there is no need to involve end 
users that much but some think the other way. I think there is some uncertainty of how to 
involve them” (Interview W29). 
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Even given these difficulties, some actors in the WASH ecosystem engage much more with 
end-users than others. For NGOs with direct experiences of responding to emergencies, there 
is the potential to learn from deploying particular solutions in the field, thereby influencing 
the future understanding of needs. Even so, the priorities are clear in that the immediate 
demands of the response project understandably need to come before those of research and 
evaluation activities. As one interviewee commented: “I would say that first we are 
operationally driven and then comes the research. So all the research we do is normally 
operational research.” (Interview W42). 
 
Not all innovation actors have the same opportunity to connect directly with the field of 
operations. This is especially so for many of the suppliers of WASH technologies who are 
frequently reliant on intermediaries for their understanding of what is needed. In the case of 
one supplier we interviewed, they rely on agencies and NGOs to feed back information from 
the field about the particular conditions of any given crisis. However, being distant from the 
point of need, they were unsure about the quality of this information and how far it is an 
accurate representation of actual needs. 
 
As explained in more detail below, there is a critical issue about the changing type and 
context of humanitarian disasters that means that the innovation landscape has to be 
constantly shifting to respond to this. It was suggested that many in the humanitarian aid 
community were primarily experienced with working in rural settings and that solutions 
designed for such environments are not appropriate for a more urban setting. A recurring 
theme in the interviews was also the need to be sensitive to the particular social, cultural, 
political, economic, and environmental conditions of humanitarian crises occurring in 
different parts of the world. Without an understanding of these complex differences, it is easy 
to offer solutions that do more harm than good. There are, nevertheless, also pressures to 
offer standardised solutions so as to achieve efficiencies. As one interviewee commented: 
“When we are talking to NGOs they usually ask us to find a universal solution. When we find 
universal solutions there is always someone who says, ‘In the South of Sudan it wouldn’t 
work’ (Interview W03). 
 
As such there is clearly a tension between providing solutions that are more generally 
applicable and ensuring that the particular requirements of emergency response are met. A 
barrier to managing this tension, according to several respondents, is the tendency to provide 
solutions that are too complicated to be usable in the context of most disasters. For one 
interviewee, “... innovation is the most simple direct means of serving needs”. Indeed, the 
general view was that many WASH related problems in emergency situations can be 
addressed through relatively simple solutions, yet there is often an impetus for developers to 
offer complex solutions that are not necessarily appropriate for the emergency context. In 
some instances this is driven by the nature of the funding process and how decisions are made 
about the allocation of resources.  As one respondent suggested: 
 
“... there are some areas where people have come up with some magical devices when 
there are things that are really very simple and doing the job very effectively ... If you 
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speak to Water Aid, for example, people are approaching them every week with a new 
magical device which is going to solve the whole world water crisis - it is usually a 
solar pump or water filter - and these devices, some go on to win competitions and get 
significant funding [when] in the end they are essentially not that appropriate.” 
(Interview W26).7 
 
Rules and routines 
 
The rules of engagement for humanitarian action are strongly influenced by key actors, 
networks, and alliances, while others have a less influential voice. Donors, governmental and 
inter-governmental agencies, and large NGOs play a powerful role in shaping the norms and 
expectations of what constitutes appropriate humanitarian response. To a large extent this 
relates back to a series of guiding values and ideals defining humanitarianism, with the 
emphasis of alleviating suffering and avoiding harm (Hilhorst, 2005; Hilhorst & Jansen, 
2012; Macrae, 1998). This results in a very cautious approach to managing risks which, in 
turn, can lead to a resistance to change. One interviewee commented: “Accountability is 
worthwhile, innovative in the HA sector context, but now it has become institutionalised - fits 
into boxes, fit for purpose, evidence base, value for money, etc., etc., what was very 
worthwhile and noble in its intent, became, like so much in the humanitarian sector, it has 
become institutionalised, professionalised.” (Interview W10). Similarly, as Dijkzeul et al. 
(2013, pS4) have suggested: 
 
“Especially since the Rwandan genocide of 1994, and the subsequent soul-searching 
in the humanitarian community … the humanitarian sector has witnessed an 
(incomplete) trend towards professionalisation, promoted the use of common 
standards and indicators … put greater emphasis on education and training, and paid 
more attention to evaluation and accountability of humanitarian action. 
Simultaneously, this has reinforced a related trend to develop manuals, guidelines, 
and other instruments to improve—or at least to formalise—humanitarian action.” 
 
A good example of efforts to standardise and regularise humanitarian response has been the 
SPHERE project (The Sphere Project, 2011). Initiated in 1997 by the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent movement and supported by a number of NGOs and other agencies, the 
aim has been to establish a set of common principles, rights, and duties, such as the right to a 
life with dignity, the right to receive humanitarian assistance, and the right to protection and 
security. It also emphasises the accountability of humanitarian agencies to affected 
                                                          
7 The following comment from Dorea (2014, p. 2) vividly describes the problems of separation between the 
developers and users of emergency WASH technologies: “Water treatment technologies exemplify the slow or 
non-existent effective uptake of new developments in humanitarian emergencies. Many novel 'high-tech' 
processes that are efficient in the removal of particular contaminants in controlled conditions do not become 
effective solutions in practice. Field experience suggests that some of the commercially-available treatment 
'kits', many do not seem to be compatible with humanitarian relief requirements. Some of the common 
shortcomings are the inability of these technologies to cope with field conditions typically encountered in 
resource-limited humanitarian emergency contexts. Arguably, this is also a shortcoming of the development 
process of these technologies.” 
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communities. It seeks to put these principles into practice by setting a series of core and 
minimum standards. The aim is to provide a universal framework for emergency response 
projects. However, there is a paradox at the heart of this attempt to translate universal 
humanitarian principles into universally applicable practices that are appropriate for all 
situations (Dufour, Geoffroy, Maury, & Grünewald, 2004). This is evident in the way the 
SPHERE Handbook is presented “as a tool to recognise different contexts and to adapt 
response programmes accordingly: it guides practitioners in their reflections around reaching 
a universally applicable standard in a concrete situation or context” (The SPHERE Project, 
2011, p.11).8 According to some respondents, the demands of universality and sensitivity to 
context are contradictory. For example, one interviewee commented as follows: 
 
“… in some places, Western Sudan and Darfur, it’s very difficult to reach a SPHERE 
standard of 14 litres per person per day because there is not surface water in the dry 
season and people live off very small amounts of water. So to get 14 litres per person 
per day it’s pretty difficult in Darfur. So you have to be careful how you use them. 
When SPHERE came out in the first place people worried [donors] would use it as a 
whip - If you don’t meet certain standards you don’t get our money” (Interview W40). 
 
This does not, of course, mean that setting standards does not serve useful purposes. Where 
there are urgent pressures to deliver humanitarian response, standards can potentially save 
time and decision-making resources by reaching agreement on what should be delivered 
away from the heat of engagement. However, standardisation taken too far can obviously 
have negative effects where the conditions of application change or are unpredictable. This is 
especially problematic in situations where there is a disconnect between operational activities 
and those with the resources and influence to promote and diffuse innovations in how these 
activities are undertaken. Given the general absence of market signals, NGOs, UN agencies, 
and other organisations shaping humanitarian innovation are dependent on other mechanisms 
for making connections between the spaces where innovations are generated and developed 
and where they are used. 
 
As suggested by a number of respondents, there have been progressive attempts in recent 
years to develop a more systematic evidence-base from which to make decisions about 
improving operational activities and equipment and how resources for innovation are 
allocated (c.f. Dijkzeul et al., 2013). However, there are still a number of barriers. Several 
interviewees spoke of the divide between NGOs and universities that can make 
communication between them difficult.  The two sets of actors tend to have different 
perspectives on the degree of accuracy and level of rigour required by research and the time 
required to conduct it. As one interviewee commented: “The time frame for NGOs is very 
different from the time frame for scientists. If we were just doing research it would be 
                                                          
8 The SPHERE Handbook is nearing the end of a long process of a major revision, following an extensive 
consultation process involving thousands of contributors. The commitment to improvement is unquestionable 
and benefits will hopefully ensue. Nevertheless, it would be a remarkable achievement if the new edition 
successfully addresses the tension between the ambitions of wedding universal humanitarian principles to the 
specific challenges of individual disasters through the practice of standard setting.   
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longer.” (Interview W30). Another suggested that there are different standards of evidence 
and accuracy between NGOs and universities, describing the evidence collected by NGOs as 
being more anecdotal. However, from the NGO perspective there is a question about how 
much evidence is actually needed to serve their purposes. The standards of practice accepted 
within the academic scientific community may not be necessary to provide sufficient grounds 
on which to make decisions about alternative products or approaches. 
 
There are important limitations here in terms of the practicalities of conducting research and 
evaluation in emergency situations. 
 
“One of the challenges is that in emergency situations it is not deemed appropriate to 
do research and that can be very true but if it is always deemed inappropriate to do 
research than how can we actually get to evidence based practice because no one is 
ever doing any research because the situation is always so critical.” (Interview W26). 
 
Especially in rapid onset emergencies and in the early stages of responding to humanitarian 
crises, research evidently needs to take lower priority than providing assistance to those 
affected.  
 
Gathering systematic evidence has become more important for humanitarian organisations to 
justify novel and untried technologies and approaches to funders. Larger NGOs have 
increasingly found it necessary to document what they are doing and collect evidence to show 
the suitability and effectiveness of a given approach or piece of equipment.  For example, 
Oxfam GB has been conducting cost analysis and testing of solar powered water pumps to 
evaluate their feasibility in emergency contexts. This resulted in technical data on the pumps 
– data that can be used to allay any concerns of donors about the predictability of the 
technology and/or whether the higher upfront costs sufficiently offset the lower running costs 
compared to traditional solutions. 
 
Results 
 
The humanitarian system is influenced by evolving practices of evaluation that periodically 
set in motion waves of change, but for the most part support incremental improvement and 
have tended to be quite reactive and strongly influenced by the need to maintain support from 
donors (Pérouse de Montclos, 2012). For example, the various coordination mechanisms 
introduced since 1971 have each been the result of formal evaluations conducted after notable 
failures in humanitarian response. These prompted new organisational arrangements, which 
could be considered innovations in themselves, but were mostly about optimising existing 
ways of working. According to Barnett (2005, p. p.729): 
 
“The field was becoming rationalized, aspiring to develop: methodologies for 
calculating results, abstract rules to guide standardized responses, and procedures to 
improve efficiency and identify the best means to achieve specified ends. 
Humanitarian organizations were also becoming bureaucratized, developing spheres 
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of competence, and rules to standardize responses and to drive means-ends 
calculations. Professionalism followed, with demands for actors who had specific 
knowledge, vocational qualifications that derived from specialized training, and the 
ability to follow fixed doctrine.” 
 
Furthermore, the care ethic central to humanitarianism has been translated into a strong 
emphasis on accountability. However, this can also lead to an unwillingness to experiment 
with new technologies and approaches. Referring to a particular donor organisation, one 
interviewee commented: “They’re so stuck in their ways of to get a predictable outcome you 
need to do this, this, and this. And you should not be innovating and experimenting on people 
in refugee camps … They really don’t like to be seen doing anything that has any element of 
a risk with it.” (Interview W34). 
 
In the absence of market mechanisms, a key potential driver of innovation is the high level of 
concern within the humanitarian aid sector resulting from the occurrence of an increasing 
number and severity of emergency situations. The perception of need serves to focus people, 
activities, and resources on innovative efforts. In the case of WASH, there is a widely held 
view that without innovation, the sector will not be able to meet the increasing and shifting 
demand for emergency response. Not only is there an increasing trend in the number, 
frequency, and severity of humanitarian crises, but it is also generally acknowledged that the 
nature of disasters themselves is changing. This change has implications for the types of 
emergency response that are appropriate. 
 
The worldwide growth in urbanisation is a key factor here. The proportion of people living in 
urban areas is estimated to increase to 67% of the global population by 2050, compared to 
47% in 2000 (OCHA, 2013).  Much of this shift will be in the least developed countries, with 
the proportion set to double to 50% over the same period. As several respondents suggested, 
many of the current solutions employed by the WASH sector were designed for non-urban 
situations and may not be appropriate for the future. The Haiti earthquake in 2010 was 
identified as an important turning point in recognising the need for different solutions in 
responding to urban disasters. In the words of one of our respondents: 
 
“Haiti [was] a wake-up call – the product, processes and programming modalities that 
we have are no longer fit for purpose. The number of horror stories that you hear on 
the WASH side in Haiti - people trying to build pit latrines in concrete or where there 
was a very high water table, or people getting caught in contracts with Portaloo 
companies ... with no cost recovery mechanisms or exit strategy, nowhere to put the 
slurry, I could go on and on. It made us realise that we didn’t have the tools that we 
need. And donors and agencies recognised that.” (Interview W32). 
 
It is evident that the historical progression of particular kinds of humanitarian crisis has had 
an important influence on shaping the overall pattern of innovations in the WASH sector. 
This includes not only the type of innovations generated, but also the intensity of effort, 
resulting in ebbs and flows in the innovation ecosystem over time. For example, the serious 
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problems in coordinating the humanitarian response to the Indian Ocean earthquake and 
tsunami in 2004, and similar problems in dealing with the crisis in Darfur in 2004 and 2005 
prompted the development of the cluster approach (Stoddard, Harmer, Haver, Salomons, & 
Wheeler, 2007). The implication is that the innovation ecosystem as a whole tends to evolve 
in response to different humanitarian events. This historical trajectory appears to take the 
form of what has been termed a punctuated equilibrium with bursts of concentrated activity 
punctuating longer periods of less intense development (Gersick, 1991).    
 
Thus, specific disasters and their projects of response cast a historical shadow of varying 
length, with new events adding to and sometimes transforming the humanitarian agenda.  It 
remains to be seen, but it is likely that this punctuated equilibrium will become more 
compressed as the incidence of disasters increases and offers more and more experiences 
from which to learn. However, there is by no means a straightforward linear connection 
between humanitarian crises, perceptions of need, innovation activities, and innovation 
outcomes. The processes of identifying needs and deciding on appropriate solutions is 
complicated by such things as the numbers of stakeholders involved, competing perspectives 
on priorities and how to tackle them, uncertainties about the specific conditions presented by 
different disasters, and limits on knowledge flows from the point of need to those seeking to 
develop innovations in the WASH sector. As we have seen for each of the practice 
components discussed above, there are elements of each that generate a separation between 
operational projects and innovation activities, which means that the capacity for learning 
between the two domains is critical. 
 
Conclusion 
  
Taken together, the different areas of practice in the humanitarian system we have explored 
have had the effect of concentrating on the narrow efficiency of project delivery at the 
expense of promoting wider innovation in the field. According to Obrecht and Warner, (2016, 
p. 21): “The humanitarian system features perverse incentives and many other institutional 
blockages to change. These arise as a result of broken feedback loops between users and 
producers and indirect links between those who fund an innovation and the innovation’s 
intended end users.” These blockages are often connected to a particular discourse of project 
management that over-emphasises the efficacy of planning and control, focuses on 
minimising short-term risks at the expense of long-term improvement and capacity 
development, and reinforces an institutional logic resistant to change. Even so, there are some 
indications of the emergence of a growing discourse of innovation that may provide a 
competing logic and, with sufficient momentum, the potential for transforming the dominant 
state-of-affairs. Innovation was a key theme at the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 
2016, bringing this issue more to the fore. However, processes of discursive and institutional 
transformation are typically not quick. An explicit interest in innovation came onto the 
humanitarian agenda around 10 years ago, but it takes time for such ideas to develop, become 
accepted, and begin to shape practices. There has arguably been an acceleration of these 
processes, but the effects are still playing out and remain to be seen. 
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